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THERE AIN'T NO SUCH THING
AS A FREE LUNCH: A LOOK AT STATE
GIFT DISCLOSURE LAWS AND THE
EFFECT ON PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANY MARKETING
SCOTT VELASQUEZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Oh, "tanstaafl" means "There ain't no such thing as a free lunch."
And isn't, I added, pointing to a FREE LUNCH sign across room, "or
these drinks would cost half as much. Was reminding her that
anything free costs twice as much in the long run or turns out

worthless.1

The popular acronym, TANSTAAFL, properly describes
legislators' view on the gifts physicians receive from drug makers.2
For many years, physicians were lavished by pharmaceutical
companies with expensive gifts, such as tropical vacations,
weekend golf outings and fancy dinners.3 These gifts from the
pharmaceutical manufacturers are believed to create a conflict of

* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, The John Marshall Law School. The author
would like to thank his family and friends for their continued encouragement

and support.
1. Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress 162 (G.P. Putnam's

Sons 1997) (1966). The acronym describes Heinlein's view that an unbalanced
economy is certain to cause problems in society. The acronym was also made
popular by renowned economists, such as Milton Friedman. See Edward G.
Dolan, TANSTAAFL: The Economic Strategy for Environmental Crisis (Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston 1971) (arguing for an economic system that identifies
hidden costs so that everyone benefiting from the environment must pay for
it).
2. Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on
Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290 J.A.M.A. 252 (July 9, 2003) (emphasis
added) (presenting empirical and social science research that asserts gifts do
create an unconscious bias towards a certain product or drug in the mind of
the physician).
3. See George Kanabe, The Medical Industry's Practice of Giving Gifts to
Doctors. How Should the Law and Professional Regulations Address It?
FINDLAW (Jan. 13, 2004), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/student2004Ol13kanabe.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (discussing the types of gifts given to
physicians by pharmaceutical manufacturers).
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interest, and physicians end up prescribing certain drugs over
another for personal gain or bias.4
In response to the rising concerns from constituents about
increasing health care costs and the relationships between
physicians and pharmaceutical manufacturers, federal and state
legislators have enacted laws to control the amount and type of
gifts that can be given to physicians.5 These laws require that
companies disclose the quality and value of each gift given to
physicians. Led by Minnesota and Vermont, state legislatures are
enacting gift disclosure laws with increasing frequency.7
In an attempt to forecast the effects state gift disclosure laws
may have on the pharmaceutical industry, Part I will discuss the
history of pharmaceutical marketing. The Comment will then
present a more detailed background on federal and state gift
disclosure laws. Part II will analyze the effects gift laws have had
and the best marketing practices that pharmaceutical companies
can implement in light of the new laws. Finally, Part III will
propose a mandatory federal gift disclosure law to help deter the
influence that pharmaceutical companies have on physicians.

II. BACKGROUND
A. PharmaceuticalManufacturerMarketingPractices
From its origins the pharmaceutical industry has focused a
bulk of its resources on marketing to its most effective salesperson,
the physician.8 Even as early as the late nineteenth century, drug
makers have used techniques to promote their products to
physicians, including "distinctive packaging, 'pull' or demandstimulation strategies, and even the design and commissioning of

4. See Susan Coyle, Physician-Industry Relations. Part 1: Individual
Physicians, 136 ANNALS OF INT. MED. 397 (Mar. 2002) (discussing a study
surveying whether physicians, in prescribing prescription drugs, are
consciously influenced by the gifts given to them by drug makers).
5. Jonathan K. Henderson & Quintin Cassady, Drug Deals in 2006:
Cutting Edge Legal and Regulatory Issues in the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 15
ANN. HEALTH L. 107, 130 (2006).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 129.
8. See Kalman Applbaum, PharmaceuticalMarketing and the Invention of
the Medical Consumer, 3 PUB. LIBR. OF SERVICE MED. e189 (Apr. 2006)
available at http://medicine.plosjournals.orgtperlserv?request=get-document&

doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0030189 (discussing marketing theory in the
pharmaceutical industry and the evolution of the prescription drug consumer.
In addition, the author argues that corporate marketers participate in
unethical "disease mongering," leading consumers to lose their objectivity and
view pharmaceutical manufacturers as saviors).
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medical almanacs that functioned as vehicles for promotion of
disease awareness. " 9
As the patient's first line of contact, the physician serves as
both the prescriber and a pseudo-salesperson. More importantly,
these relationships of gift-giving and gift-accepting may create a
conflict of interest with the physicians' fiduciary and ethical
responsibilities to their patients.10
Currently, the pharmaceutical industry is a $122 billion
industry." Pharmaceutical companies spend an estimated twelve
to fifteen billion dollars on promoting their products, with nearly
eighty-four percent of that amount directed toward "detailing,"
which includes the gifts and samples given to physicians."
B.
1.

FederalEnforcement

Legislation

To effectively police the practices of drug makers and
maximize compliance, the federal government utilizes a variety of
fraud and abuse laws. 3 The federal government primarily uses
three statutes to regulate drug producers: the Medicare and
Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute, 4 the Civil False Claims Act

9. Id.; see also Louis A. Morris et al., The Attitudes of Consumers Toward
Direct Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 101 PUB. HEALTH REP. 82 (1986)
(finding that consumers want more information about consumer drugs and
favorably view direct-to-consumer advertising); Center for Medical
Consumers, http://www.medicalconsumers.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2006)
(providing free access to the general public to allow medical consumers to
make more informed decisions in medical situations).
10. See Alexander C. Tsai, Policies to Regulate Gifts to Physicians from
Industry, 290 MED STUDENT J.A.M.A. 1776 (October 2003) (commenting on the
trend of legislation and professional guidance created concerning the gifts
given to physicians by pharmaceutical manufacturers).
11. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Marketing and Direct-toConsumer Advertising (DCTA) of Pharmaceuticals, http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/health/rxads.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2006) (reporting on state bills
enacted, filed, and "related resources describing or affecting the marketing
and advertising of pharmaceuticals").
12. See Jesse C. Vivian, Federal Limits on Gifts from Pharmaceutical
Companies, U.S. PHARMACIST, Nov. 2002, at 11 (focusing on predicting the
trends of pharmaceutical company marketing after implementation of the
Final OIG Guidance) The author predicts that the OIG Guidance will have a
positive effect on marketing conduct, resulting in reduced sample distributions
and restrictions on sponsorships of educational and recreational activities. Id.
13. Marc J. Scheineson & Shannon Thyme Klinger, Lessons from Expanded
Government Enforcement Efforts Against Drug Companies, 60 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (2006).
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(FCA),'" and the Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) of
1987.16
The Anti-Kickback
Statute regulates
the offer of
remuneration for recommending the purchase of supplies
reimbursable through government healthcare programs. 7 The
statute punishes the knowing or willful offer, payment, solicitation
or receipt of remuneration to induce business payable by a
government healthcare program.18 However, manufacturers find
relief through the Anti-Kickback Statute's twenty-two safe-harbor
provisions. 9 According to the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
the safe-harbor provisions were "designed to specify various
payment and business practices which, although potentially
capable of inducing referrals of business under the Federal and
State healthcare programs, would not be treated as criminal
offenses."2
The FCA, used primarily by the Department of Justice,21
"establishes liability for any person who knowingly presents or
causes to be presented a false claim for payment" from a
government-run program." A key element of the FCA is that it
provides incentives to employees with insider knowledge to report
FCA-liable claims.23
Finally, the PDMA is used by the federal government to
"address certain prescription drug marketing practices that
contributed to the diversion of large quantities of drugs into a

15. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).

16. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t), 333(b) (2006).
17. See Scheineson, supra note 13, at 5 (generalizing the purpose of the

Anti-Kickback statute)
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b.
19. Id.; see also OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23, 731 (Apr. 18, 2003) (providing guidance for
pharmaceutical manufacturers).
20. See Scheineson, supra note 13, at 5 (allowing pharmaceutical
manufacturers these safe harbor provisions necessarily indicates that federal

and state authorities will have the ability to more closely scrutinize their
conduct); see also Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., Clarification of the Initial
Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor
Provisions Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63, 518 (Nov. 19,
1999) (expounding on existing safe harbor provisions, while presenting new
safe harbor provisions).
21. See Scheineson, supra note 13, at 5 (detailing the different elements of

the FCA).
22. Id.
23. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006); see also Tax PayersAgainst Fraud - What
Is the False Claims Act & Why Is It Important?, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD,
http://www.taf.org/whyfca.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006) (explaining why the
False Claims Act is beneficial to taxpayers who hope to recover money stolen
through fraud by government contractors).
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secondary grey market."24 The purpose of the PDMA is to create a
safeguard for prescription drug distribution to ensure the safety of
pharmaceuticals. 2' The PDMA creates liability for acts such as the
distribution of free samples and the sale of discounted drugs to
healthcare providers .26
In recent years, OIG has taken the lead in providing
compliance guidelines for pharmaceutical manufacturers.2 7 In
2003, OIG created its Final OIG Guidance, stating the "purpose of
the compliance program is to encourage the use of internal
controls to efficiently monitor adherence to applicable statutes,
regulations and program requirements." 8
Although the
compliance program is not mandatory, pharmaceutical companies
who follow the program in good faith likely will reduce their risk of
unlawful conduct.'

24. See Scheineson, supra note 13, at 6 (describing the types of offenses
which could potentially violate the PDMA); see also Civil Resources Manual
113 - The Prescription Drug Marketing Act (November 1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousafoia-readingroom/usam/title4/civOO113.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2006) (putting in plain English the provisions of the PDMA
for civilians).
25. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t), 333(b). See, eg., In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales
Practices Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d 8, 9 (D. Mass. 2004) (discussing the TAP
Pharmaceuticals litigation).
26. See Scheineson, supra note 13, at 6 (listing several other PDMA liable
acts including "the sale, purchase, trade, or counterfeiting of prescription drug
coupons (i.e. coupons redeemable for free or low-cost prescription drugs); the
wholesale distribution of prescription drugs in interstate commerce without a
state license; and the re-importation of exported prescription drugs by anyone
other than the drug's manufacturer"); see also R.B. Greenberg, The
Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, 45 AM. J. OF HEALTH-SYS.
PHARMACY 2118 (1988) (providing a historical description of the PDMA at the
time it was enacted by Congress).
27. Similarly, the OIG has taken the lead in other health care areas. See
OIG Compliance Guidance for Individual and Small Group Physician
Practices, 65 Fed. Reg. 59, 434 (Oct. 5, 2000) (assisting physicians with
voluntary guidelines to follow in order to help compliance with statutes
applicable to federal health care programs).
28. See OIG Compliance Guide, supra note 19, at 23,731 (educating
pharmaceutical manufacturers on the best practices to follow when creating
corporate compliance programs); see also Solicitation for Information and
Recommendations for Developing a Compliance Program Guidance for the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 66 Fed. Reg. 31, 246 (June 11, 2001) (requesting
input from other legislative bodies for the creation of the OIG Guidance
Program).
29. See OIG Compliance Guide, supra note 19, at 23, 732 (noting the
benefits of compliance program). Law firms provide compliance guidance
programs for manufacturers seeking to meet the terms of OIG Guidance. See,
e.g., Rebecca L. Burke & Robert J. Saner III, OIG's Compliance Program
Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 2003, available at http:/www.
ppsv.com/issues/pharma.htm (explaining the OIG Guidance program); Robert
B. Ramsey III, Strategies for Getting Your Compliance Program to Be Where It
Should Be, 2003, available at http://www.bipc.com/news.cfm?ode=article&
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The importance of these federal laws and initiatives is that
they produce a domino effect within the states by compelling the
states to enact similar legislation. For example, after the passage
of the PDMA, Florida adopted legislation parallel to the PDMA3
2. Accomplishments
Armed with an array of laws, the federal government has
kept a watchful eye on the conduct of the pharmaceutical
industry.31 Recently, "the federal government has increasingly
regulated, investigated, and fined the pharmaceutical industry."32
Two recent settlements with TAP Pharmaceuticals and ScheringPlough Corporation demonstrate the severity of punishments for
violating federal laws.
In October of 2001, TAP agreed to the largest health care
fraud settlement in history. TAP paid $875 million to resolve
fraudulent drug pricing and marketing conduct." The government
charged TAP under the Anti-Kickback Statute and the PDMA,
alleging the company inflated drug prices for which Medicare

articleid=608&practice.id= (discussing best strategies to implement OIG
compliant procedures).
30. See Scheineson, supra note 13, at 7 (discussing the difficulties in
passing the PDMA and similar pharmaceutical industry legislation); see also,
FLA. STAT. § 499.005 (2006) (requiring all of the elements of the PDMA and
documentation of the pedigree, or source of the drug and noting that the
Florida Prescription Drug Protection Act is the most stringent law of its kind
in the country).
31. See Scheineson, supra note 13, at 7 (noting the history of fraud and
abuse laws); see also Alice G. Gosfield, The Hidden Costs Free Lunches: Fraud
and Abuse in Physician-PharmaceuticalArrangements, MEDICAL PRACTICE
MANAGEMENT, Mar./Apr. 2005, at 253 (reviewing existing regulatory and
ethical guidance applicable to physician-pharmaceutical relationships, and
offering tips to help comply with the guidance principles).
32. Jonathan Wilkenfeld & Judith Braun Davis, Five Things You Can Do to
Prepare for Compliance in All 50 States - Starting Today, 25
PHARMACEUTICAL

EXECUTIVE

62,

(Sept.

2005),

available at

http:/!

www.polarismanagement.com/Publications/StatesCompliance.pdf (explaining
their five-step approach to compliance, which includes: cross-functional teams,
track everything, short-term policies/long-term strategies, communication and
train, and audit against adherence).
33. Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection:Should Legislatures and the
Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose
the Wrongdoings of Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316 (1993); see also Robert
Vaughn, Thomas Devine & Keith Henderson, The Whistleblower Statute
Prepared for the Organization of American States and the Global Legal
Revolution ProtectingWhistleblowers, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 857, 863-65

(2003) (discussing a template for model whistleblower law); Melody Petersen,
2 Drug Makers to Pay $875 Million to Settle Fraud Case, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 4,
2001, at 1. The TAP Pharmaceutical settlement also paved the way for
whistleblower laws. In essence, whistleblower laws protect employees from
retaliation by their companies for their actions of reporting suspicious or
illegal activity to a government agency. Id.
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would reimburse physicians and for remunerating prescribers for
samples that could later be resold.34 In a more recent settlement,
Schering-Plough Corporation agreed to pay $435 million for
illegally marketing a brain tumor drug.35 Schering purportedly
promoted the drug for types of cancer for which it was not
approved and also defrauded the Medicaid program.36
C. Industry Initiated Compliance
At the opposite end of this relationship are the physicians,
who constantly face an ethical dilemma when dealing with
friendly (and very generous) drug salespeople."
Drug makers
spend between $8,000 and $13,000 on marketing or "detailing" to
each physician."
Torn between professional standards and
economic reality, physicians are conflicted on whether they should
accept gifts from pharmaceutical manufacturers.
However,
34. See Petersen, supra note 33, at 1 (describing the historic TAP
Pharmaceuticals fraud settlement in detail); Scheineson, supra note 13, at 7
(noting the significance and enormity of the TAP settlement).
35. Christopher Bowe, Schering Pays Dollars 435m to Settle DOJ Probe,
FIN. TIMES (London, England), Aug. 30, 2006, at 24; Denise Lavoie, ScheringPlough Agrees to Plead Guilty, Pay Fine, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2006, at D03;
Julie Schmit, Schering-Ploughto Pay $435 Settlement, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 29,
2006, at 31.
36. See Schmit, supra note 35, at 31 (recounting the details of Schering's
fraudulent actions, including promoting a drug which did not have FDA
approval).
37. William J. Hall, The Ethical Dilemma of Accepting Gifts from Drug
Makers, AM. C. OF PHYS. AM. SOC'Y OF INTERN. MED. OBSERVER, Dec. 2001,
available at
http://www.acponline.org/journals/news/dec01/president.htm
(noting that while it is "appropriate and necessary for the pharmaceutical
industry to market its products to physicians and provide information," the
physician-pharmaceutical relationship should be governed by the physician's
ethical responsibility to his or her patient).
38. Id.; see also Editorial, A More Ethical Pizza, WASH. POST, April 17,
2003, at A22 (noting the limitations being set on the amount of money
lobbyists may spend on congressmen and their staff); Robert Pear, Drug
Makers Battle a U.S. Plan to Curb Rewards for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
2002, at 1 (informing the reader of pharmaceutical industry's plan to resist the
Bush administration plan to restrict the rewards given to doctors to encourage
them to prescribe their drugs).
39. See Manish Agrawal & David Steinberg, Ask the Ethicist: Should a
Medical Practice Accept a Gift with Strings Attached?, MED. ETHICS (Lahey
Clinic, Burlington, MA), Fall 2001, available at http://www.lahey.
org/NewsPubs/Publications/Ethics/JournalFall200 1/Journal Fall200 l_Ethicist
.asp (presenting the ethical dilemma to two physicians on whether or not a
doctor should accept a gift of valuable software from large pharmaceutical
company in exchange for the monitoring of prescribing patterns). On the
opposite side of this argument are gifts from patients. While most gifts from
patients are given in good nature as sign of gratitude, often times it becomes a
inappropriate gift when given with certain expectations of the physician. See
James D. Capozzi & Rosamond Rhodes, Gifts from Patients,86 J. BONE JOINT
SURG. 2339 (2004) (advising physicians to treat gifts from patients with the
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professional organizations have taken the lead in guiding medical
professionals around this dilemma. °
The American Medical Association's (AMA) Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs provides guidance to physicians for
dealing with sales representatives and how to accept or reject
promotional

gifts.

41

The

AMA's

Working

Group

for

the

Communication of Ethical Guidelines on Gifts to Physicians from
Industry asserts, "Physicians have a unique professional
relationship with patients and have an ethical responsibility to
place the health and welfare of the patient ahead of economic selfinterest."42
Similarly, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) provides guidance to pharmaceutical companies
regarding their relationships with physicians. 3 Similar to the
Final OIG Guidance, the PhRMA Code on Interactions with
Healthcare Professionals is voluntary, but it provides companies
with advice in the areas of general interaction, entertainment,
same standards as they treat gifts from pharmaceutical companies).
40. See Henderson, supra note 5, at 123 (noting that while guidance offered
by professional organizations is completely voluntary, it gives both
manufacturers and federal regulators the ability to see what the ideal conduct
should be). See generally David Studdert et al., FinancialConflicts of Interest
in Physicians' Relationships with the Pharmaceutical Industry - Self
Regulation in the Shadow of FederalProsecution, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1891
(Oct. 28, 2004) (discussing the movement by professional organizations, such
as the American Medical Association, to provide their members with more indepth guidance in physician-pharmaceutical relationships to comply with
federal regulation).
41. Ethical Opinions and Guidelines, AM. MED. ASS'N, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4001.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2006); see also Gardiner Harris, In Article, Doctors Back Ban on Drug
Companies' Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at A14 (referring to an article in
the Journal of the American Medical Association that notes a group of
influential American doctors believe that gifts to physicians "hurt patients and
should be banned"); Am. Med. Ass'n, Opinion E-8.061: Clarifying Addendum,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4263.html
(last
visited Nov. 3, 2006) (clarifying the original AMA Ethical Opinions and
Guidelines).
42. See Statement of the Working Group, AM. MED. ASS'N, available at
http://www.ama- assn.org/ama/pub/category/4003.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2006) (presenting the working group's goal).
43. PhRMA Code on Interaction with Healthcare Professionals,
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (Jan. 2004); see also
PhRMA
Adopts New
Marketing Code, PhRMA, available at
http://www.phrma.org/phrma-adopts-new-marketing-code (last visited Oct. 1,
2006) (noting the implementation of the new PhRMA marketing code). The
addition of the PhRMA Code has led to several large pharmaceutical
manufacturers adopting it into their own code of conduct. PR Newswire, Tap
PharmaceuticalProductsAmong First to Adopt PhRMA Marketing Code of
Ethics, (June 13, 2002), availableat http://www.prnewswire.com/cgibin/stories.
pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/06-13-2002/0001746876& EDATE= (last
visited Oct. 2, 2006).
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continuing education, consultants, and educational and healthcare
practice related items."
D. State Gift Disclosure Laws
1.

Minnesota

Minnesota is at the forefront of state legislation requiring
disclosure of marketing expenditures. In 1993, the Minnesota
legislature succumbed to pressure from constituents 45 and enacted
a statute that prohibits "pharmaceutical manufacturers from
making certain gifts to 'practitioners' and a related statute that
imposes reporting obligations when giving certain non-prohibited
payments to practitioners."'
The Minnesota statute generally prohibits pharmaceutical
companies from offering or giving any gift of value to a
practitioner.47 However, the statute includes certain exemptions
such as samples provided for free to patients and items whose

44. PhRMA Code, supra note 43; see also Henderson, supra note 5, at 127
(noting the benefits received by pharmaceutical manufacturers if they comply
with the OIG guidance, including: demonstration of company's commitment to
responsible conduct, increased likelihood of preventing unethical conduct,
encouragement of employees to report problems, and minimization of financial
loss).
45. Pressure to limit gifts given to officials has long been a concern of
American citizens. See Opinion, The Gift Horse's Mouth, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
1993, at 14 (discussing the actions by former Minnesota Senator Paul Wellston
to propose legislation that requires Congressmen to itemize the gifts, trips and
meals they receive); see also Lynn Sweet, Disclosure Legislation a Great Start,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sep. 21, 2006, at 37 (praising new legislation which makes
available to the public reports on all federal spending); Editorial, Why Isn't
Gov Questioning ControversialGift, Job?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sep. 18, 2006, at 37
(questioning the connection between Governor Blagojevich's acceptance of
monetary gift for his daughter from his best friend and the job given to the
governor's best friend's wife).
46. See Henderson, supra note 5, at 146 (stating the author's view on the
purpose of Minnesota's gift disclosure legislation). According to Minnesota
State Senator John C. Hottinger, "Minnesota has long led the nation in
ensuring access to affordable, quality health care... by making sure
pharmaceutical companies reveal all they know about the safety, effectiveness
and side effects of their prescription drugs." News Release, Legislation
Ensures Patient Safety, Honesty from PharmaceuticalCompanies, available at
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/members/member-pr-display.php?id=359
(last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
47. MINN. STAT. § 151.461 (2005); see also Ron Buzzeo, Sales Management:
Gifting Laws Cause Regulatory Woe - New Legislation Forces Drug Companies
to Rethink Marketing and Sales Initiative, available at
http://www.
pharmexec.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=333321
(last visited
June 1, 2006) (noting that with more states attempting to enact gift disclosure
legislation, pharmaceutical manufacturers will have to be ready to change
their marketing practices to comply with each state).

The John Marshall Law Review

[41:563

combined retail value is less than fifty dollars." In addition,
companies who have marketed to physicians in Minnesota must
disclose annually to the Minnesota Board of Pharmacy all
payments made to practitioners. 4 As the first state to pass gift
disclosure legislation, Minnesota's statute provided the initial
template for other states to follow. 0
2.

Vermont

Vermont was the second state to enact gift disclosure
legislation.5 Taking a broader approach than Minnesota, Vermont
requires any "pharmaceutical manufacturing company" to disclose
"the value, nature and purpose of any gift, fee, payment, subsidy
or other economic benefit" provided to physicians. 2 The Vermont
statute also includes similar exemptions as Minnesota and
requires an annual disclosure, however, Vermont differs from
Minnesota in the severity of its punishment. 3 The Vermont
48. MINN. STAT. § 151.461; see also Henderson, supra note 5, at 147 (noting
the elements of the Minnesota gift disclosure statute). To understand the
overall importance of prohibiting gifts in Minnesota, see generally Minnesota
Campaign Finance Board - Advisory Opinion #147, available at
http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/ao/AO147.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2006)
(discussing the prohibition of gifts to state officials in relation to other
Minnesota statutes).
49. See MINN. STAT. § 151.47 (2005) (including wholesale distributors under
the statute).
50. In addition to guiding other states to follow their example, Minnesota's
gift disclosure statute has led professional organizations in Minnesota to adopt
the principles of§ 151.47. See Minn. Med. Ass'n. Res. 407, 153rd mtg., sess. II
(Minn. 2006), available at http://www.mmaonline.net/Portals/mma/PDFs/
Annual%20Meetings/2006/D407.pdf#search=%22resolution%20407%202006%
20physicians%20with%20information%20benefits%20consequences%20drug%
20samples%20manufacturer%22 (last visited Jan. 13, 2008) (amending the
Minnesota Medical Association's policy on gift giving by adding, "The MMA
will provide physicians with information about the benefits and consequences
of accepting
drug
samples
from
pharmaceutical
manufacturer
representatives").
51. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 205 (2005). The Vermont statute posed a
problem to many. See Marshall Kapp, Drug Companies, Dollars, and the
Shaping of American Medical Practice, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 237, 251 (2005)
(discussing the dilemmas faced by research and practice centers because of
their heavy reliance on large pharmaceutical manufacturers); Press Release,
Office of the Secretary of State et al., Guide to Vermont's Pharmaceutical
Marketing Disclosure Law, (Sept. 2002) (on file with author) (introducing
pharmaceutical companies to the intricacies of Vermont's marketing
disclosure laws).
52. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4632 (2007); see also PowerPoint Presentation
by Karmen Hanson, Policy Specialist, National Conference of State
Legislatures, available at http://www.nlarx.org/policy/pdfs/ (follow "Rx
ReportingDisclosureHanson2005" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 2, 2006) (on file
with author) (providing further interpretations of the Vermont Statute).
53. See supra note 51 (describing and differentiating the elements of
compliance between the Vermont statute and the earlier Minnesota Statute);
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Attorney General's Office may bring an action for injunctive relief,
costs, attorney's fees and civil actions of up to $10,000 against any
pharmaceutical company that violates the statute.M
III. ANALYSIS
The enactment of gift disclosure legislation in Minnesota and
Vermont is an indication of the positive trend toward regulating
gifts to physicians. The success and effects of state disclosure laws
will not be fully calculable until more states or the federal
government enact similar legislation because there is a limited
amount of information available concerning the value and
effectiveness of these gift disclosure laws.
This Part will analyze the current trend and effects of state
marketing disclosure laws and the federal legislation that will
likely follow. First, although limited information makes it difficult
to determine whether Minnesota and Vermont's disclosure laws
have been as effective as originally hoped, a large number of states
have proposed similar marketing disclosure legislation. Second, as
long as only a handful of states require disclosure, manufacturers
will continue to spend exorbitant amounts on marketing to
physicians.
Finally, the actions by the states foreshadow
inevitable action by the federal government. Federal gift
disclosure legislation is likely on the horizon as a result of voters'
serious concerns about healthcare costs, based on the 2006
Congressional election and the 2008 Presidential election.
A. Domino Effect
Since Minnesota and Vermont became the first states to enact
local marketing disclosure laws, four more states have passed
similar legislation."
States believe that the voluntary OIG
guidance and industry initiated guidelines are not enough to
control
the imprudence
of some pharmaceutical
sales
representatives .56
see also Rebecca Dresser, Pharmaceutical Company Gifts: From Voluntary
Standardsto Legal Demands, THE HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, Mar. 1, 2006, at 8

(discussing the basic principles of Vermont's statute).
54. VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 33 § 205; see also Allen M. Kirschenbaum et al.,
Application of Health Care Fraud and Abuse Laws to Pharmaceutical
Marketing, (Hymans, Phelps & McNamara, Washington D.C.) Sept. 20, 2006,

at 37 (updating the recent amendments made to Vermont's statute).
55. See Kevin B. O'Reilly, More States Considering Gift-Disclosure
Legislation: Many of the Proposals Would Put the Names of Physicians

Accepting a Drugmaker's Gift Worth $25 or More on a State List Open to the
Public, American Medical News, Mar. 20, 2006, available at http://www.amaassn.orglamednews/site/free/prsa0320.htm (discussing the history and trend of
proposed gift-disclosure legislation in a handful of states, including the

opposition from industry and professional organizations).
56. Julie Appleby, States Want Info About Drugmakers' Gifts to Doctors,
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Maine, West Virginia, District of Columbia & California

In 2003 the District of Columbia 7 and Maine 8 passed gift
disclosure laws, and West Virginia 9 followed suit in 2004.
Although these laws are similar in a number of aspects, including
financial disclosure of gifts to physicians, each state's goals and
reasons for enacting disclosure laws differ."0 For example, West
Virginia requires disclosure of drug advertising costs to protect its
citizens from being unfairly influenced.61 Conversely, to ensure
good faith practices, Maine has amended its disclosure statute to
require certification from the manufacturer's CEO or president
that its disclosure reports to the state are accurate.62
California statute SB 1765' is unique because it requires
pharmaceutical companies to adopt and disclose "a comprehensive
compliance program that is in accordance with the Final OIG
Guidance and the PhRMA Code." 4 However, the implementation
of such an extensive statute will be difficult considering the Final
OIG Guidance is voluntary and manufacturers will have trouble
discerning recommendations from requirements." Accordingly, as
the nation's most populous state, the way the statute is handled in

USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2006, at 4B.
57. D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-831 (2001).
58. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2698-A (2006).
59. W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-1 (2006).
60. See OIG Compliance Program, supra note 19, at 23,731 (discussing the
purposes and benefits of implementing a compliance program for
pharmaceutical manufacturers).
61. Health Care Industry Alert, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, West
Virginia Law Requires Disclosure of PharmaceuticalMarketing Costs (Dec. 17,
2004) (on file with author).
62. Pharmaceutical Industry Alert, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, New
Amendment to Maine Drug Price Reporting Requirement Revises CEO
CertificationRequirement; Additional Maine Disclosure Law Passed (Aug. 16,
2005) (on file with author) (informing clients of the recent changes made by
the Maine legislature to ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2698-A, which includes
additional requirements that manufacturers disclose their costs in connection
with clinical trials); see also, Daily Health Policy Report, Federal Judge
Dismisses Lawsuit Against Maine Law Requiring PBMs to Disclose Financial
Information (Apr. 14, 2005), available at http://w-ww.kaisernetwork.org/
(discussing
the
1st
daily-reports/rep index.cfm?hint=3&DRID=29356
Circuit's dismissal of a lawsuit challenging the Maine law requiring pharmacy
benefit managers to disclose financial information. The plaintiffs alleged that
the law infringed trade secret protections).
63. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 119402 (West 2006).
64. See Henderson, supra note 5, at 145 (offering a brief synopsis of the
California's mandatory compliance statue, and noting that the statute is very
dense and loaded with ambiguities).
65. See id. at 146 (adding the fact that pharmaceutical manufacturers have
to deal with several other California state statutes, including the Unfair
Competition Law of the Ann. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 and California
False Claims Act).
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California will forecast how the plaintiffs bar and states consider
similar proposed legislation."
2. Proposed Legislation
Even though states such as West Virginia have found it
difficult to implement their disclosure statutes, 67 a cornucopia of
states have proposed similar marketing disclosure legislation.'
The majority of these states are reacting to the sudden increase in
legal action taken against pharmaceutical manufacturers69 and
have, for the most part, patterned their laws after Vermont's
statute. 0 While this positive trend hopefully will continue, not all
states are receptive to disclosure laws, especially those states
where elected officials depend heavily on pharmaceutical industry
dollars.7 Several proposed disclosure laws have died or have been
stalled in several state legislatures.7
66. See Wilkenfeld, supra note 32, at 1 (recognizing that "[o]nly in 2004,
when California enacted its law requiring companies to establish a
comprehensive compliance program ... did some firms begin to consider the
impact of the new law on the overall business approach as opposed to just the
business in one particular state").
67. See MeetingsNet, The State of State Regs, (July 1, 2006), available at
http://meetingsnet.com/medicalmeetings/mag/meetings-state-state-regs
(last
visited Feb. 14, 2008) (discussing briefly the state disclosure laws in
Minnesota, Vermont, D.C., Maine, and California).
68. The following states currently have or have proposed a form of gift
disclosure legislation: Vermont, Maine, Minnesota, California, Connecticut,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. State Laws and Bills Requiring
Disclosure of Gifts to Physicians, available at http://www.amsa.org/prof/
giftdisclosures.cfm (last visited Feb. 9, 2008); see also O'Reilly, supra note 55
(relating the inclination that state legislatures are currently experiencing
towards proposing and passing disclosure legislation).
69. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the TAP Pharmaceutical and Schering
Plough settlements as two of the largest pharmaceutical fraud cases in
history).
70. See Appleby, supra note 56 (stating that "many of the proposals being
considered this year are modeled after a 2002 law in Vermont").
71. Robert Brodsky & Kaitlin Hasseler, Drug Makers' Dimes Funds
Congressional Travel: Pharmaceutical Companies, Affiliated Trade Groups
Spent More Than $600,000 on Trips, The Center for Pub. Integrity (Aug. 30,
2006), available at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/powertrips/report.aspx?
aid=715 (last visited Feb. 14, 2008) (reporting that certain members of
Congress were given more than $600,000 in free travel from pharmaceutical
companies and affiliated special interest groups).
72. See MeetingsNet, The State of State Pharma Marketing Regs: New
Proposals, July 7, 2006, available at http://meetingsnet.com/cmepharma/
state-regs-proposed/index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (providing, in
relation to the continuing medical education ("CME") industry, an update on
proposed disclosure legislation in several states, including Connecticut and
Mississippi). In addition, the author notes that proposed legislation is being
stalled by efforts from the pharmaceutical industry in states such as Hawaii
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However, a few states are overstepping the boundary of
reasonable regulation.
The Massachusetts state legislature
proposed a law banning any and all gifts given to physicians, a
violation carrying penalties of up to $5,000 and/or two years in
prison.73 The Massachusetts proposal died in committee in early
2007. To maintain the physician-pharmaceutical relationship,
which is essential to providing effective healthcare, a healthy
balance of regulation and freedom is necessary. 74
B. An Honest Reaction?
1.

CorporateCompliance

Naturally, the big question that arises is whether these state
statutes will force manufacturers to cut back on marketing
expenditures made to physicians. Manufacturers fear that losing
big money because of smaller marketing budgets.7 '
However,
initial reports from Vermont show that manufacturers have
actually spent more on marketing.6 The amount spent on gifts
jumped 26%, from $2.46 million in 2003 to $3.11 million in 2004. 7
Pharmaceutical manufacturers also are concerned with their
reputations, and each manufacturer has established its own
disclosure compliance program. 8 In that sense, it appears that
disclosure laws are having their desired effect. However, after
closer inspection, it appears that manufacturers' compliance
programs are only window dressing. For example, Pfizer has
implemented an expenditure limit of $2,500 per covered medical or

and New Jersey. Id.

73. S. 399, 2005 Leg., 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2005); H.B. 2683, 2005 Leg.,
184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2005).
74. See CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELFREGULATION AND DEMOCRACY 130-31 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (arguing
that corporate self-regulation, through compliance programs, is effective in
creating harmony between corporations and legal institutions in today's
complex society).
75. See M.A. Morgan et al., Interactionsof Doctors with the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 32 J. OF MED. ETHICS 559, 560 (2006) (reporting that the vast
majority of obstetrician-gynecologists believe accepting drug samples and
informational lunches is part of a normal physician-pharmaceutical

relationship).
76. See O'Reilly, supra note 55 (noting that several years after the passage
of Vermont's disclosure statute, industry spending on marketing actually has
gone up).

77. Id.
78. See John Mack, What PharmaCompanies Spend on Gifts to Docs: State
Laws Require Declarations,PHARMA MARKETING NEWS, (Feb. 2006), available
at http://www.pharmamarketingnews.com (detailing the compliance programs
of the major pharmaceutical manufacturers, including Bristol-Myers Squibb,
Pfizer, Novartis, AstraZeneca, Proctor & Gamble Pharmaceuticals, Organon,

and Centocor) (on file with author).
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health care professional.79 Although this is a significant reduction
from previous per-physician expenditures, 0 Pfizer qualifies its
adherence by excluding gifts of "nominal value," such as "pens,
notepads, and similar 'reminder' items."8" Similarly, Novartis'
$2,500 per-physician limit compliance program creates an obvious
loophole exception:
Consistent with similar marketing laws (e.g. Vermont, Maine, D.C.),
certain items (e.g. plastic pens, small post notepads) or activities
(e.g., in-office food or beverage provided on an occasional basis) of
limited value
(less than $25) will not be included in NPC's annual
82
dollar limit.

Since the implementation of the federal regulation, these
exceptions allow sales representatives to inundate physicians with
small gifts and meals without fear of reprisal, circumventing the
goal of these statutes, and preventing the influence of gifts on
physicians.8'
State disclosure laws affect not only the business practices of
pharmaceutical manufacturers, but also the service companies
that depend on them.84 Expectedly, attorneys and consultants are
taking advantage of the new state legislation by offering expert
advice, including monitoring techniques and developing efficient
IT systems. 5 However, with the possibility of manufacturers

79. See id. at 1 (noting that Pfizer, along with the other major
pharmaceutical manufacturers, have created specific compliance programs
that have precise rules for each section, such as gifts, promotional materials,
and other items or activities).
80. See supra Part II.C (comparing the $8,000 spent per-physician by
manufacturers in states without disclosure laws to the approximately $2,500
limit per-physician in states with disclosure laws).
81. See Mack, supra note 78, at 3 (noting the gifts that Pfizer and other
large pharmaceutical manufacturers exclude from the per-physician spending
limit); see also Anthony Do, Free Gifts: Redundancy or Conundrum?, 13 J.
GEN. INTERNAL. MED. 213 (1998) (examining a study that was conducted to

test the attitudes of physicians and patients towards ten different
pharmaceutical industry gifts, which found that physicians were likely to
accept gifts ranging from pens to trips).
82. See Mack, supra note 78, at 3 (describing Novartis'. compliance
program).
83. See id. at 1 (noting the types of gifts excluded from pharmaceutical
manufacturer compliance programs); see also Press Release, Arnold & Porter
LLP, Pharmaceutical Companies Face New State Marketing Disclosure Laws,
(Oct. 2003) (on file with author) (explaining the goals and objectives of the
Maine, Minnesota, and Vermont disclosure statutes).
84. See Warren Ross, Get Ready for the "PerfectStorm": A Panel of Industry
Insiders Look at What's Ahead, 37 MED. MKT. & MEDIA 64, 66 (2002)

(reiterating a roundtable discussion of pharmaceutical industry insiders
concerning the challenges facing manufacturers and their related industries).
85. See Press Release, Strategies for Navigating New Pharma State Gift

Laws: Audio CD/Transcript (Aug. 9, 2006) (advertising the sale of a speech
given by legal and compliance experts) (on file with author); see also
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having to comply with fifty different disclosure laws, these
strategies are not only expensive, but will never be useful.
2. Lobbying
Pharmaceutical manufacturers will not give in to the desires
of state officials nor the potential loss of income without a dog
fight. Armed with some of the most influential lobbyists in the
country,86 the pharmaceutical industry spent over $44 million in
lobbying state governments in 2003 and 2004.87 In the same
period, the pharmaceutical industry contributed almost $8 million
to campaigns of candidates for various state offices. 8 Although
seemingly successful, these costly lobbying efforts have not
stemmed the wave of state disclosure laws, because the concerns of
voters, exercised at the polls, have and will continue to prompt
politicians to pass state disclosure laws. 8
C. Health Care Costs and PoliticalImplications
Federal statutes usually forecast or prompt a legislation
change at the state level, but the trend of state disclosure laws
looks to reverse the norm. ° Although the still-to-be-determined
effectiveness of current disclosure statutes in states such as
Vermont and Maine will play an influential role, the U.S.

Wilkenfeld, supra note 32 (suggesting state disclosure laws should be grouped
into four broad categories: spending limits, cost disclosures, price disclosures
and declaration of compliance).
86. See Jordan Rau, The Nation Industry Aims to Defeat Discount Drug
Initiatives, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at 1 (stating the pharmaceutical
industry has the largest lobbying constituency on Capitol Hill and always
spends more than any other industry on lobbying); Judy Sarasohn, Tauzin to
Head Drug Trade Group, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2004, at A35; Anna Wilde
Matthews, Drug Firms Use Financial Clout to Push Industry Agenda at FDA,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at Al.
87. See M. Asif Ismail, Industry Puts $44 Million into State Lobbying:
Campaigns Push Back Against Moves to Cut Prices, Spending on Medication,
THE

CENTER

FOR

PUBLIC

INTEGRITY

(Apr.

6,

2006),

available at

http://www.publicintegrity.org/rx/report.aspx?aid=794 (last visited Feb. 9,
2008) (reporting that PhRMA and the 14 largest manufacturers account for
eighty percent of state lobbying total).
88. See M. Asif Ismail, Deep Pockets Contributeto Success: Industry Spends
Millions on State Campaign Donations, Calif Fight, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC
INTEGRITY (Apr. 6, 2006), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/rx/
report.aspx?aid=795 (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (deciphering the donations from
pharmaceutical manufacturers to election campaigns around the country,
particularly in California).
89. Ismail, supra note 87 (noting the lobbying success that the
pharmaceutical industry has had through both grassroots lobbying and large
financial donations).
90. See N.Y. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1, 18 (2002) (certifying
the power of federal preemption, stating that Congress may delegate power to
a federal agency to preempt state law).
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Congress likely will enact its own federal marketing disclosure
statute governing the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, Rep. Peter
DeFazio of Oregon introduced a House Bill entitled "Drug
Company Gift Disclosure Act,"91 which requires:
drug manufacturers, packers, and distributors to report annually to
the Commissioner of Food and Drugs any gifts provided to covered
healthcare entities in connection with detailing or other marketing
activities.92
1.

Rising Health Care Costs

For many Americans, especially senior citizens, who are the
most inclined to vote, health care costs are the number one
concern.93 Many voters are concerned with the fact that the prices
of prescription drugs are skyrocketing, and experts predict that
The
"frustration over this issue will lead to action."94
likely
will
drug
costs
prescription
lower
overwhelming pressure to
affect elected state representatives who, in turn, will either
pressure the pharmaceutical industry or, in the case that
manufacturers refuse to respond, pass legislation governing the
industry, including disclosure laws. 9
2. Election 2006
The midterm election of 2006 was as interesting and nasty as
With the Democrats in control of
any in recent memory.
Congress,97 Congressional leaders have struggled to work with
91. H.R. 4718, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006). In February 2007, the bill was
referred to Subcommittee on Health.
92. See MeetingsNet, supra note 72 (providing the exact wording of Rep.
DeFazio's proposed federal legislation).
93. See News Release, AM. ASS'N OF RETIRED PERSONS, AARP Studies Find
Rising PrescriptionDrug Prices and Rising Voter Concern About Affordability
(Sept. 19, 2006), available at http://www.aarp.org/research/press-center/
presscurrentnews/voters concernedwith affordability.html (last visited Feb.

9, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing the effects rising prices of
prescription drugs are having on the U.S. senior population).
94. See id. (quoting AARP Senior Managing Director of Government
Relations David Sloan on his view of a recent AARP election poll in surveying
the concerns of senior citizens); see also Center for Policy Alternatives,
Prescription Drug Marketing, http://www.stateaction.org/issues/issue.cfm/
issue/PrescriptionDrugMarketing.xml (last visited Oct. 25, 2006) (providing a

number of policy considerations that have caused the increase in drug prices).
95. See Meetingsnet, supra note 72 (discussing Rep. DeFazio's federal
disclosure legislation proposal).
96. See Charlie Cook, A Wild Year for Forecasting, NATIONAL JOURNAL,
2
Oct. 21, 2006, available at http://www.cookpolitical.com/column/2006/10 106.

php (on file with author) (forecasting the possibility that forty-five Republican
held Congressional seats could change hands, and give control of the Congress
to the Democrats for the first time since 1994).
97. Mike Doming, Democrats Savor Senate Win: Allen Concedes Tight

The John MarshallLaw Review

[41:563

President Bush and respond to the healthcare concerns of voters."
Especially in California, constituents' concerns over health care
will put disclosure legislation on political radars."
Similar to the 2006 congressional election, the Democratic
and Republican presidential candidates have made healthcare,
including the overhaul of the prescription drug industry, one of
their main priorities in the 2008 election. 1 00 Making health care a
priority will not only increase a candidate's chances of winning,
but will also hold elected officials more accountable for their
promises and increase the likelihood of a federal marketing
disclosure law.
This is a politically volatile combination. Combining the
urgent need for state legislation with voters' increased concerns
over pharmaceutical drug costs could lead to federal legislation
governing the disclosure of marketing and gift expenditures of
pharmaceutical manufacturers.
IV. PROPOSAL
With states rushing to pass marketing disclosure legislation,
it is quite possible that pharmaceutical manufacturers may be
required to create fifty-one individual compliance programs.1
Having to meet the requirements of fifty-one different programs
will cause similar if not greater headaches as those caused by the
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Congress
M

VirginiaRace, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 10, 2006, at 1.

98. Michael Abramowitz & Jonathan Weisman, Bush Vetoes Health
Measure, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2007, at AO1.

99. Tom Chorneau, Governor's Race: Health Care a Key Issue for Voters but Candidatesnot Talking It Up, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 26, 2006, at Al.
100. See The Democratic Party, 6 Point Plan for 2006, available at
http://www.demoracts.org/agenda.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (outlining its
"6-Point Plan," which prioritizes: Honest Leadership & Open Government,
Real Security, Energy Independence, Economic Prosperity & Educational
Excellence, A Healthcare System that Works for Everyone, and Retirement
Security); see also, OnTheIssues, Healthcare:Candidates' Views, available at
http://www.ontheissues.org/HealthCare.htm#Headlines (last visited Feb. 9,
2008) (outlining the 2008 candidates' views on healthcare).
101. See Wilkenfeld, supra note 32, at 1 (commenting that the current trend
of state gift disclosure legislation could result in an array of problems for
manufacturers and suggests methods to deal with state statutes).
102. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see also Chris Cziborr, Critics
Say Accounting Reform Has Gone Too Far: Costly New Rules in Sarbane Oxley
Act of 2002 Create Woes for Public Companies, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Aug. 8,
2005, at 17 (commenting that the accounting requirements of the Sarbanes
Oxley Act is creating a high cost of business, and disproportionately affects
smaller public companies); see also David Henry et. al, Death, Taxes and
Sarbanes-Oxley?, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 17, 2005, at 28 (noting that corporate
reform will become fundamental to America's economy); see also Special
Report, Sarbanes Oxley: A Price Worth Paying?, THE ECONOMIST, May 19,
2005 (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has done "too much and too
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should enact a simple, yet forceful, federal gift disclosure statute,
closely patterned on the statutes of Vermont and California. This
federal statute should focus on spending limits, specific cost
disclosures, and a declaration of compliance. Finally, the federal
government should enact legislation compelling physicians to
report the type and amount of gifts they receive from
manufacturers.
A. Congress Should Enact a FederalGift Disclosure Statute
Similar to Current State Statutes
Representative DeFazio's proposal is a step in the right
direction."3 However, the proposal fails in two respects. First, the
proposal is ambiguous as to whom and as to how the disclosures
will be made. Proposed section 503(h)(4) states, "Each disclosure
under this subsection shall be made in such form and manner as
the Commissioner may require."" 4 This vagueness creates too
much uncertainty and leniency, which may allow manufacturers
the wiggle-room necessary to continue providing gifts to
physicians. Second, there is no declaration requirement obligating
manufacturers to follow or adopt the OIG or PhRMA code
While most major pharmaceutical manufacturers
guidelines.
voluntarily adopted the OIG and PhRMA guidelines,"' without a
legal and public obligation to adopt the guidelines, manufacturers
are not held accountable.
To be truly effective, federal gift disclosure legislation should
implement the successful attributes of the current state statutes,
particularly Vermont and California's disclosure statutes.
Vermont's statute "is probably the most advanced of the state
disclosure laws."" 6 Vermont's statute's most important facet is its
cost disclosure requirement, which requires an aggregate
admission of all marketing expenditures spent on physicians and
disclosure of who the recipient was of each disclosure. 107 Similarly,

little."

It has created a load of paperwork and additional costs for

corporations, but it is unknown whether this measure will be effective as first
believed).
103. See MeetingsNet, supra note 72 (discussing Representative DeFazio's
proposal).
104. H.R. 4718, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
105. In an effort to comply with federal and industry recommendations, the
majority of large pharmaceuticals have adopted either the Final OIG

Guidance or the PhRMA Code. See supra discussion Part II.B.1 (discussing
the compliance programs implemented by the major pharmaceutical
manufacturers).
106. See Meetingsnet, supra note 67, at 2 (quoting attorney Garineh

Dovletian's view that Vermont's statute is the most progressive statute
because it requires that companies synthesize their information and requires
reports to state officials).

107. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 205.
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California's law requires manufacturers to implement a
compliance program that is consistent with the OIG Code and the
PhRMA Code to create more accountability of the manufacturers
and establish a more reliable and uniform regulatory
environment. 108
B. The Federal Gift Disclosure Law Should Focus on Spending
Limits, Specific Cost Disclosures,and Declarationsof Compliance
1.

Spending Limits

For a federal gift disclosure statute to be effective, it must
explicitly limit the amount that manufacturers can spend on each
physician. Through internal compliance policies, most of the large
pharmaceutical manufacturers already have spending caps in
place." 9 However, there are no negative consequences for noncompliance with company policy; neither the company nor the
salespeople are punished."' Federal spending limits, on the other
hand, should provide the necessary accountability and
repercussions. The limits should include all gifts and meals,
particularly those expenditures that are explicitly excluded from
spending limits in corporate compliance programs, such as pens,
notepads, and 'occasional' food and beverage. 1 '
Critics might argue that defined limits on spending conflict
with the economic principles of capitalism." 2 However, that
108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 119402; see also Pilar Villanueva, et. al,
Accuracy of PharmaceuticalAdvertisements in Medical Journals, 361 THE
LANCELET 27 (Jan. 2003) (concluding that physicians should be careful when
assessing drug advertisements that contain bibliographical references to
clinical trials because there is no regulation on what the manufacturers can
include in their advertisements); Sara Calabro, Party's Over, PHARMA. REG.
GUIDANCE BOOK, July 2006, at 74 (on file with author), available at
http://www.advanstar.com/test/pharmascience/pha-sci-supppromos/phasciregguidance/articles/MarketinglCalabro rv.pdf (stating that "increased
government scrutiny of... pharma-doctor relationships is forcing marketing
and sales departments to rethink virtually all strategies with compliance in
mind").
109. See Mack, supra note 78, at 2-4 (noting the internal compliance
programs of the large pharmaceutical manufacturers and their per-phyisican
caps on spending).
110. Id. at 3 (stating that the federal sentencing guidelines have made it
imperative that businesses, large and small, take initiative to implement
tougher disciplinary measures in their corporate ethics or compliance
guidelines). See generally Steven Carr, Is Your Compliance and Ethics
Program Due for a Tune-Up? (Jan. 3, 2005), available at http://www.nmrs.
comlnews/Articles-speeches.cfm
(follow "Is Your Compliance and Ethics
Program Due for a Tune-Up?" hyperlink) (discussing ethical programs).
111. See Mack, supra note 78, at 3-4 (reviewing the items excluded from
spending limits in corporate compliance programs).
112. See DAVID KORTEN, THE POST CORPORATE WORLD:
CAPITALISM

LIFE AFTER

186 (1999) (arguing the allure and promises of global capitalism
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argument has no support in the context of the modern
pharmaceutical industry. The rapid change in the industry,
combined with the uncertainty felt by those most dependent on
113
drugs, produces a strong demand for "active government policy."
In addition, the benefits of repairing consumer confidence in the
ethical practices of pharmaceutical companies, especially in the
modern era of corporate impropriety, clearly outweigh the
economic considerations of promoting
a competitive marketplace
14
within the pharmaceutical industry.'
2. Specific Cost Disclosures
The second essential requirement is specific cost disclosures.
Cost disclosures usually "require pharma companies to disclose
aggregate
and/or
per-individual
healthcare
provider
expenditures."..
However, to create the desired compliance,
federal legislation should require manufacturers to disclose the
name of each recipient in generosity.
Federal legislation
patterned from Vermont's cost disclosure language would reduce
the ambiguity as to which physicians the manufacturers are
pursuing.116
have actually lead to the realities of financial insecurity and inequality); see
also Thomas Ogletree, Corporate Capitalism and the Common Good: A
Framework for Addressing the Challenges of a Global Economy, 30 J. OF
RELIGIOUS ETHICS 79 (2002) (arguing that although capitalism has manifest
strengths, public oversight is necessary to reduce capitalism's negative
consequences). Contra David Cameron, On the Limits of the Public Economy,
459 ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL.& SOC. SCI. 46 (1982) (concluding that contrary
to conventional thought, high levels of spending does not cause stagflation).
113. See HENRY GRABOWsKI & JOHN VERNON, THE REGULATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 1-13 (1983)

(introducing the rationale behind federal regulation of the pharmaceutical
industry); PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE 194-96 (1980) (arguing that

federal oversight and regulation is necessary in the pharmaceutical industry
because of the factors of innovation and health). The federal government has
had a serious role in governing the food and drug industry since the early
1900's.

See RICHARD ABOOD, PHARMACY PRACTICE AND THE LAW 277-78

(2005) (discussing federal regulation of the pharmaceutical industry).
114. See ETHICS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 282 (Michael Santoro

& Thomas Gorrie eds., 2005) (analyzing the growing tension between the
public and the pharmaceutical industry).
115. See Wilkenfeld, supra note 32, at 64 (outlining the states which have
specific cost disclosure elements in their gift disclosure statutes).
116. See Appleby, supra note 56, at 4B (noting the use of the Vermont
statute as a "template" for other states). Obviously, the pharmaceutical
manufacturers provide very little insight into the doctors they currently have
relationships with or which doctors they are currently pursuing. See Kimit
Rai, The Physicianand the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 43 BRIT. COLUM. MED. J.
346, 346-47 (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.bcma.org/public
bcmedicaljoumalbcmj/2001/july-august 2001/physicianandpharm.asp
(stating "there is ambiguity from both the point of the physician and the
industry").
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3. Declarationof Compliance
Finally, the federal statute should require manufacturers to
implement or adhere to the Final OIG Guidelines and the PhRMA
Code. California requires all pharmaceutical companies doing
business in the state to adopt a compliance program in accordance
with Final OIG Guidelines and the PhRMA Code and "annually
declare, in writing" that they are in compliance with both
programs.117 The federal legislation should follow the lead of
California in this respect, by including a mandatory declaration of
compliance in its gift disclosure legislation. It is crucial to the
success of a federal disclosure statute that manufacturers are
continually required to affirm their adherence to federal and
industry-wide compliance programs.
C. PhysiciansShould Be Required to Disclose
the Gifts They Receive
Manufacturers should not be the only party responsible for
complying with a federal disclosure statute. Physicians also
should be held responsible for accepting these gifts. Currently,
physicians are only encouraged to report violations of promotional
activity regulations."' There is no federal mandate that requires
physicians to disclose the type or amount of gifts they receive.
Similar to federal election contribution disclosure laws, the
government should mandate an annual disclosure requirement
that obligates doctors to disclose all gifts or meals they receive
from pharmaceutical manufacturers in value of $50 or more. 1 9
Although passing legislation that forces physicians to disclose
their finances may prove to be difficult, it is important to hold both
parties accountable.2'
V.

CONCLUSION

The importance of gift disclosure legislation in today's
corporate and political climate cannot be dismissed. As the giants
of the pharmaceutical industry continue to settle fraud and abuse
cases with the government, 2' the public has lost trust in the

117. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 119402 (2006).

118. U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Laws, Regulations, Guidances, and
Enforcement Actions, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac (last visited

Nov. 8,2006).
119. 11 C.F.R. 104.5(a) (2006); H.R. 4718, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
120. See Hanfried Helmchen, Ethical Implications of RelationshipsBetween
Psychiatrists and the PharmaceuticalIndustry (Aug. 28, 2004), available at
httpJ/www.wfsbp.org/fileadmin/pdf/world-journalpublic/26Relationships

betweenPsychiatristsandPharmaceuticallndustry.pdf (noting that the growing
size and intensity of the relationship between manufacturers and physicians
necessitate the need for government regulation).
121. See Petersen, supra note 33, at 1 (discussing the enormity of the TAP
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pharmaceutical industry, and the physician-manufacturer
relationship has deteriorated. 12 In response to these changing
conditions, legislators in nearly half of the states have enacted or
proposed gift disclosure legislation. Manufacturers themselves
have also worked to help eliminate fraud in their industry.
However, to create more confidence in the pharmaceutical
industry the federal government must enact its own gift disclosure
legislation. The effectiveness of gift disclosure legislation will not
be evident for several years. What is evident, however, is that
these pieces of legislation will help restore the shaken confidence
in the pharmaceutical industry.

Pharmaceuticals settlement in light of recent fraud and abuse cases).
122. Jeanne Lenzer, Scandals have Eroded U.S. Public's Confidence in Drug
Industry, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 247 (2004).

